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                             OPINION 
 
                                            
 
 STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
         Defendant/Appellee W.G. Products terminated Plaintiff/Appellant 
Claus 
Glandorf on March 2, 1998.  Prior to Glandorf's termination, W.G. Products 
sponsored a 
group health insurance plan with Blue Cross/Blue Shield.  Upon his 
termination, Glandorf 
was notified that he had a right to COBRA coverage.  For three months 
after his 
termination Glandorf made premium payments to W.G. Products on the 
assumption he 
was securing COBRA benefits.  At some point during the summer of 1998, 
Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield informed Glandorf that he was not eligible for COBRA 
because W.G. 
Products allowed its employee's insurance coverage to lapse prior to 
Glandorf's 
termination.   
         The president of W.G. Products testified in his deposition that 
Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield canceled the insurance policy as of February 2, 1998, 
but did not notify 
W.G. Products of the cancellation until June of 1998.  He stated that he 
did not receive 
any notices of a failure to pay the premium between February 2, 1998 and 
June 1998.  
Rather, the company's insurance agent told him that W.G. Products had a 
large credit and 
was working it off.  Glandorf does not dispute that he received a refund 
of his three 
payments. 
                                I. 
         Glandorf first contends that he was entitled to COBRA coverage.  
We agree 
with the District Court that he was not. 
         COBRA requires employers that sponsor a group health plan for its 
employees to provide continuation coverage for employees who lose their 
coverage as a 
result of a qualifying event.  See 29 U.S.C.  1161.  Termination 
constitutes a qualifying 
event.  See 29 U.S.C.  1161(2).  Congress enacted COBRA so that employees 
who lose 
their job as a part of a partial layoff can purchase continuation medical 
coverage at a rate 
approximately equal to the group rate, which is lower than the rate for 
individual 
coverage.  See Local 217, Hotel & Rest. Empl. Union v. MHM, Inc., 976 F.2d 
805, 809 
(2d Cir. 1992).  Continuation coverage is "coverage which, as of the time 
the coverage is 
being provided, is identical to the coverage provided under the plan."  29 
U.S.C. 
 1162(1).   
         As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Local 217, 
COBRA 
provides that coverage need only extend until the "date on which the 
employer ceases to 
provide any group health plan to any employee."  Id. at 809 (quoting 29 
U.S.C.  
1162(2)(B)).  Further, "an employer is under no obligation flowing from 
COBRA to 
adopt a group health plan or to maintain one that is in existence."  Id.  
"Once an employer 
ceases to maintain any group health plan . . . COBRA releases the plan 
administrator from 
the obligation to provide continuation of coverage at the group rate."  
Id. at 809-10. 
         Here, the uncontradicted evidence establishes that W.G. Products 
failed to 
pay its premiums and its Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan lapsed on February 2, 
1998, prior to 
the date of Glandorf's termination in March.  Accordingly, there was no 
such coverage 
for any employee on the date of Glandorf's termination, and W.G. Products 
had no 
COBRA obligation to him by virtue of its Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan. 
         Glandorf argues in the alternative before us that W.G. Products 
self-insured 
during the period between the cancellation and the beginning of its new 
Amerihealth 
coverage on September 1, 1998.  According to Glandorf, W.G. Products 
retroactively 
paid all of the claims of its employee beneficiaries which would have been 
paid by Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield had the insurance not been canceled during this interim 
period.  We are 
not persuaded that this self-insurance argument was advanced in the 
District Court and 
that it is properly before us.  It is apparent, however, that it is 
without merit.  As we have 
noted, the statute imposes a COBRA coverage duty only on those employers 
that have an 
insurance plan in place on the date of termination.  It is clear on the 
basis of the 
undisputed facts that W.G. Products did not have such a plan in March of 
1998.  
Unbeknownst to it, its Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan had terminated on 
February 2nd.  It 
had not at that point established a new plan   self-insured or otherwise   
because it 
believed its Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan was still in effect. 
         Finally, Glandorf argues that W.G. Products should be equitably 
estopped 
from arguing that he is not eligible for continuation benefits.  Section 
502(a)(3) of ERISA 
permits a plaintiff to obtain equitable relief to redress violations of 
ERISA.  See 29 
U.S.C.  1132(a)(3); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 137 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  To 
succeed on a claim for relief under a theory of equitable estoppel, an 
ERISA beneficiary 
must establish a material misrepresentation, reasonable and detrimental 
reliance upon the 
representation, and extraordinary circumstances.  See In re Unisys Corp. 
Retiree Medical 
Benefit ERISA Lit., 58 F.3d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1995); Curcio v. John 
Hancock Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir.1994).  The District Court denied 
this claim on the 
ground that Glandorf had not shown extraordinary circumstances.  While we 
are inclined 
to agree with the District Court, the clear, short and sufficient answer 
to this contention is 
that Glandorf failed to come forward with any evidence from which a trier 
of fact could 
conclude that he reasonably relied to his detriment on his employer's 
representation that 
he was entitled to COBRA.  Indeed, Glandorf affirmatively asserts that he 
was unable to 
get alternative coverage from another insurer when he was terminated 
because his wife 
had a pre-existing medical condition.  It necessarily follows that he has 
failed to show that 
he took, or failed to take, action to his detriment in reliance on the 
misrepresentation.  See 
generally Smith, 6 F.3d at 137 ("To establish injury, the Smiths must show 
they could 
have obtained an alternative health insurance policy that provided for 
coverage . . . were it 
not for the Hospital's misrepresentations."). 
         While we are sympathetic to the Glandorfs, the summary judgment 
entered 
in favor of W.G. Products must be, and will be, affirmed. 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
         Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion. 
 
                                    /s/ Walter K. Stapleton 
                                    Circuit Judge 
 
